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Abstract
This article traces the contributions of African states to the development of inter-
national refugee law and explores the role African human rights supervisory bodies
have played in the interpretation and application of this field of law. While Africa’s
contributions to international refugee law are often overlooked, this article sets out
to identify Africa’s involvement in the drafting process of the UN Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. It also explores the legal framework for refugees
in Africa, in particular the OAU Refugee Convention and the Bangkok Principles on
Status and Treatment of Refugees, and the extent to which these two instruments
have enriched international refugee law. The article argues that some of their provi-
sions may provide evidence of customary rules of international law. Lastly, it exam-
ines some of the authoritative pronouncements made by African human rights
supervisory bodies, in so far as they adopt a progressive approach to interpreting
the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers.
Keywords
Refugee definition, 1951 Refugee Convention, 1969 OAU Convention, Bangkok
Principles, African human rights system, African states
INTRODUCTION
Among the most important African contributions to the development of
international refugee law are the expanded refugee definition and the recog-
nition of the principle of non-refoulement1 in its widest sense. These
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1 This principle prohibits states from returning refugees or asylum-seekers to territories
where there is a risk that their life or freedom would be threatened.
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contributions, which have been the subject of extensive scholarly debate, are
reflected in the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee
Convention). Yet, as this article seeks to demonstrate, some of Africa’s contri-
butions to this field of law are also reflected in earlier regional instruments,
particularly the 1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of
Refugees (Bangkok Principles) adopted by the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee (AALCC),2 as well as in the legislative history of the
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee
Convention) and its subsequent 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol). While most
of Africa was still part of colonial empires during the drafting process of the
UN Refugee Convention itself, later problems associated with decolonization
in Africa and Africa’s own initiative to deal with the resulting movements of
refugees were at the centre of the negotiations leading to the 1967 Protocol.
The international legal framework for refugees had thus to accommodate
and reflect the full scope of interests of the “new” members of the inter-
national community. Although their influence did not result in a complete
overhaul of this field of law (which remains very much linked to its
European origins), African states contributed to reshaping international refu-
gee law, in particular the scope of the refugee definition, to reflect their inter-
ests and needs. The African human rights system, founded on the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), has further devel-
oped protection standards that often adopt a generous approach to the protec-
tion of refugees and asylum-seekers. Furthermore, supervisory bodies
entrusted with human rights promotion and protection within the African
human rights system, although subject to some constraints, continue to con-
tribute to the progressive development of international refugee law.
The purpose of this article is to bring into the legal debate on refugee pro-
tection the, arguably often overlooked, contribution of African states and the
African human rights system to this field of law. Divided into three parts, the
article begins by identifying Africa’s contributions to the drafting process of
international instruments relating to the legal status of refugees adopted
before 1951, as well as the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. It
explores the proposal that led the drafters of the UN Refugee Convention to
extend its application to other groups, as well as the circumstances triggering
the revision of the convention.3 The article then moves on to provide an over-
view of the legal framework for refugees in Africa. It considers not only the
2 The AALCC was founded to serve as an advisory body in the field of international law and
as a forum for Asian-African cooperation. See: <http://www.aalco.int/39thsession/aal
cccairoI.pdf> (last accessed 28 December 2020). It is now called the African-Asian Legal
Consultative Organization (AALCO).
3 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Vienna Convention), art 32,
the preparatory work of a treaty serves as a supplementary means of interpretating the
text (in this case, the UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol). Also, the Vienna
Convention, art 31 states that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
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OAU Refugee Convention, but also the Bangkok Principles, which were formu-
lated following a reference by the only African member of the AALCC at that
time: the government of Egypt.4 In doing so, the article revisits the extent to
which these two instruments have enriched international refugee law.5
Lastly, the article takes a non-exhaustive look at some of the authoritative pro-
nouncements made by African human rights supervisory bodies in so far as
they adopt a progressive approach to the interpretation of the rights of refu-
gees and asylum-seekers. In so doing, it explores the role these regional bodies
play in the interpretation and application of international refugee law.
THE BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSAL
REFUGEE DEFINITION: RETHINKING AFRICA’S CONTRIBUTIONS
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
Following the League of Nations’ adoption of various arrangements relating to
the legal status of specific categories of refugees,6 in 1928 the League of
Nations Council created the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission on
Refugees.7 This commission was of the opinion that a formal convention
would, inter alia, be “the most effective means of assuring refugees of stability
for their legal status”.8 It recommended that governments interested in a solu-
tion to the refugee problem be invited to a conference “for the purpose of
drawing up and adopting a final text of the Convention, to be open to subse-
quent accessions”.9 Based on the number of refugees to whom they had
extended “hospitality”, 13 states were listed as the “most interested in solving
the refugee problem”, among which was Egypt.10 In 1933, after a three-day
meeting attended by representatives of 13 European countries,11 China and
contd
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose”.
4 “Status and treatment of refugees” (AALCO, 39th session) at 1, available at: <http://www.
aalco.int/39thsession/strcairoIV.pdf> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
5 This article does not consider the African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, 2009 (the Kampala Convention).
6 These included Russian and Armenian refugees and later Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean per-
sons of Syrian or Kurdish origin, and persons of Turkish origin. See, for example, CM
Skran “Historical development of international refugee law” in A Zimmermann (ed)
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 196 Protocol: A Commentary
(2011, Oxford University Press) 6.
7 RJ Beck “Britain and the 1933 Refugee Convention: National or state sovereignty?” (1999)
11/4 International Journal of Refugee Law 597 at 604.
8 Id at 604, footnote 37.
9 Id at 608.
10 Ibid.
11 These were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the 1933 Refugee
Convention was ratified by Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Italy and Norway.
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Egypt, a Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees (1933
Refugee Convention) was subsequently adopted.12 Contracting parties could
introduce modifications or amplifications at the moment of signature or
accession to the convention. Interestingly, when signing the convention,
unlike its European counterparts, the government of Egypt specified that “it
reserved the right to expand or limit the definition given in the Convention
as it wished”.13 In 1946, under the auspices of the Economic and Social
Council, the International Refugee Organization Constitution was adopted,
which laid down certain broad criteria that foreshadowed the definition of
refugee that would later appear in the UN Refugee Convention.14
Remarkably, the delegate of Egypt, the only African state among the 18 states
that became members of the constitution, proposed, though unsuccessfully,
that the phrase “concerning displaced persons” be deleted from section 1B
of annex I. This deletion would have meant that repatriation was advisable
for both refugees and displaced persons.15
The main contributors to the drafting of the UN Refugee Convention, par-
ticularly at the earlier stages of the drafting process, were representatives
from western European powers.16 At the opening session of the Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, which
adopted the UN Refugee Convention itself, 23 states were represented,
among which only four were “non-western”: Egypt, Colombia, the former
Yugoslavia and Iraq. The other states represented were Australia, Canada,
USA, Israel and 15 European states (including Turkey).17 With regard to the
refugee definition, the views expressed during the discussions show two differ-
ent approaches: those who feared a general definition and advocated for a pre-
cise definition listing specific categories of refugees; and those who wished to
see a general definition applicable to all refugees.18 For instance, France’s
12 However, it limited its scope to those groups already considered refugees by early agree-
ments of the League of Nations. See 1933 Refugee Convention, art 1.
13 Emphasis added. “UNConference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons: Summary record of the nineteenth meeting” (26 November 1951), UN doc
A/CONF.2/SR.19, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/3ae68cda4/co
nference-plenipotentiaries-status-refugees-stateless-persons-summary.html> (last accessed
28December 2020). Although Egypt signed the 1933 Refugee Convention, it never ratified it.
14 International Refugee Organization Constitution, sec A(1)(c) included the elements of
“for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion” as requirements to qualify
for refugee status. Moreover, annex I, sec C(1)(a)(i) allowed for individuals validly to
object to repatriation on the basis of “persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds
of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinions” (emphasis added).
15 H Adelman and E Barkan No Return, No Refugee: Rites and Rights in Minority Repatriation
(2011, Columbia University Press) at 300, footnote 39.
16 F Viljoen “Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and
humanitarian law” (2001) 1/1 African Human Rights Law Journal 18 at 25.
17 T Einarsen “Drafting history of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol” in
Zimmermann (ed) 1951 Convention, above at note 6, 40 at 59.
18 C Harvey Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects (2000, Butterworths) at 25.
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delegate proposed inserting the words “in Europe” after the phrase “as a result
of events occurring”.19 The Italian delegation supported the French amend-
ment to “restrict the application of the Convention to European refugees
alone”.20 In contrast, the British delegate wished to see the adoption of a gen-
eral definition that would not be confined to European refugees alone.21
Likewise, the Egyptian delegate agreed that the “definition was broad, but
that was exactly how it should be”.22 He emphasized that the aim of his dele-
gation “was to grant to all refugees the status for which the Convention pro-
vided”, stressing that “withhold[ing] the benefits of the Convention from
certain categories of refugee would be to create a class of human beings
who would enjoy no protection at all”.23 To support his claim, he pointed
to article 6 of chapter II of the Statute of the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, UNHCR Statute), which had made the
refugee definition applicable to “all categories of refugees”.24 Within this con-
text, the Egyptian delegation submitted an amendment to expand the scope
of the UN Refugee Convention to cover other groups of refugees.25 While
the situation of Palestinian refugees seems to have been the main reason trig-
gering his proposal, the Egyptian representative highlighted that the conven-
tion “should … apply to all categories of refugees”.26 In the words of the
Egyptian delegate, “any limitation of the Convention in time or in space
could only weaken [the protection of refugees]”.27 Moreover, it should be
recalled that, when signing the 1933 Refugee Convention (before the
Palestinian exodus), the government of Egypt had already reserved the right
19 UN General Assembly (GA) “Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. France:
Amendment to article 1” (13 July 1951), UN doc A/CONF.2/75, available at: <https://www.
unhcr.org/protection/travaux/3ae68ce870/draft-convention-relating-status-refugees-
france-amendment-article-1.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
20 “Summary record of the nineteenth meeting”, above at note 13.
21 Harvey Seeking Asylum in the UK, above at note 18 at 25.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid (emphasis added).
24 Ibid (emphasis added). See also art 6(B) of the UNHCR Statute (adopted 14 December
1950), UN doc A/RES/428(V).
25 The amendment reads: “When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, with-
out the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, they shall ipso facto be
entitled to the benefit of this Convention”: GA “Draft Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. Egypt: Amendment to article 1” (3 July 1951), UN doc A/CONF.2/13, available
at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/3ae68ce1c/draft-convention-relating-status-
refugees-egypt-amendment-article-1.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
26 “Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons:
Summary record of the twenty-ninth meeting” (GA, 28 November 1951), UN
doc A/CONF.2/SR.29 (emphasis added), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/do
cid/3ae68cdf4.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
27 Ibid.
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to expand the refugee definition given in that convention.28 Egypt’s amend-
ment was finally adopted by 14 votes to two, with five abstentions, and
found its recognition in the second sub-paragraph of article 1(D) of the UN
Refugee Convention.
The definition of the term “refugee” was enshrined in article 1(A) of the UN
Refugee Convention, which was however limited temporally, applying only to
refugees who had been displaced “as a result of events occurring before 1
January 1951”.29 Additionally, by making a declaration, contracting states could
specify that such “events” would only mean “events occurring in Europe”.30
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
In the 1960s, the newly independent African states had not much incentive for
becoming parties to the UN Refugee Convention “because of the non-
universality of the refugee definition”.31 Only 11 African states became parties
to the convention or informed the UN Secretary-General that they considered
themselves bound by it.32 Of these states, the Central African Republic and
Togo made a declaration whereby they interpreted the term “events occurring
before 1 January 1951” in the refugee definition to mean “events occurring in
Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951”, thus widening the scope of their
obligations under the convention.33 African states saw the UN Refugee
Convention as a “European instrument” that did not actually reflect their
interests or the particular needs of African refugees.34 Indeed, subsequent geo-
political events, such as decolonization and independence struggles in Africa
and the resulting movements of refugees, made it obvious that refugees were
neither temporary nor confined to Europe.
In 1964, UNHCR started to consider the possibility of completely removing
the temporal and geographical limitations from the UN Refugee Convention
as the only way to secure the relevance of the UN Refugee Convention with
28 “Summary record of the nineteenth meeting”, above at note 13.
29 See UN Refugee Convention, art 1(A)(2).
30 See id, art 1(B)(1).
31 Einarsen “Drafting history”, above at note 17 at 69.
32 These are Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire,
Dahomey, Ghana, Morocco, Niger, Togo and Tunisia. See GA “Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees: Supplement no 11” (1 January 1964), UN doc
A/5511/Rev.1, annex II, para 5, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-lk/exco
m/unhcrannual/3ae68c3f4/report-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html> (last
accessed 28 December 2020).
33 Id, para 1.
34 See for example, P Weis “The Convention of the Organisation of African Unity Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa” (1970) 3 Revue des Droits de l’Homme
449. See also MB Rankin “Extending the limits or narrowing the scope?
Deconstructing the OAU refugee definition thirty years on” (2005) (UNHCR New Issues
in Refugee Research working paper no 13) at 4.
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respect to other categories of refugees, including African refugees.35
A Colloquium on the Legal Aspects of Refugee Problems, held in Bellagio on
28 April 1965 (Bellagio Colloquium), considered inter alia these limitations
and the possible measures by which the UN Refugee Convention might be
adapted to new refugee groups “for whom no appropriate legal instrument
exist[ed]” at that time.36 Particular reference was made to the fact that regional
organizations were contemplating the adoption of regional instruments for
the protection of refugees in their particular areas.37 Indeed, at that time,
the OAU had started its own work on a refugee convention designed to
meet regional exigencies and be separate from the UN Refugee
Convention.38 Its draft article 31 “provided that the African refugee conven-
tion would supersede all preceding bilateral and multilateral agreements
relating to refugees”.39 The members of the Bellagio Colloquium agreed
that, while it was appropriate to adopt measures to deal with refugee pro-
blems at a regional level, these should be “supplementary to measures
adopted on a universal level”.40 Within this context, the Bellagio
Colloquium agreed to adapt the UN Refugee Convention by means of a proto-
col that would apply to new refugee situations that had arisen after 1951.41
In 1966, UNHCR submitted a proposal to, inter alia, the contracting states to
the UN Refugee Convention, in which it proposed extending the personal
35 Einarsen “Draftinghistory”, aboveat note17 at 70. See also “Colloquiumon theLegalAspects
of Refugee Problems (note by the High Commissioner)” (GA, 5 May 1965), UN
doc A/AC.96/INF.40, para 2, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/collo
quia/3ae68bea8/colloquium-legal-aspects-refugee-problems-note-high-commissioner.
html> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
36 “Colloquium on the Development in the Law of Refugees with Particular Reference to
the 1951 Convention and the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees held at Villa Serbelloni Bellagio (Italy) from 21–28 April
1965: Background paper submitted by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 1965” (UNHCR, 28
April 1965), UN doc MHCR/23/65, para 10, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/pro
tection/colloquia/3ae68be77/colloquium-development-law-refugees-particular-reference-
1951-convention.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
37 “Colloquium on the Legal Aspects”, above at note 35, para 9.
38 During the first stages of the drafting process of the OAU Refugee Convention, some
delegates proposed a refugee definition totally independent of that in the UN Refugee
Convention, including individuals compelled to flee “owing to aggression by another
state, or as a result of an invasion by an aggressive state”: E Arboleda “Refugee definition
in Africa and Latin America: The lessons of pragmatism” (1991) 3/2 International Journal of
Refugee Law 185 at 190–94.
39 M Sharpe The Regional Law of Refugee Protection in Africa (2018, Oxford University Press) at
25. For more details about the drafting history of the OAU Refugee Convention, see id at
22–34.
40 “Colloquium on the Legal Aspects”, above at note 35, para 9.
41 Id, para 4. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that, “in the last few years [he]
had to interest himself, inter alios, in the following new groups of refugees: Algerian refu-
gees, Rwandese refugees, Sudanese refugees, refugees from Angola and from Portuguese
Guinea”: “Colloquium on the Development”, above at note 36, para 6.
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scope of that convention.42 At the session of the UNHCR Executive Committee
(ExCom) in 1966, Dr Schnyder, the then High Commissioner for Refugees,
explained the background to the proposal. The meeting record, as subse-
quently shown, proves that UNHCR sought to preserve the primacy of the
UN Refugee Convention worldwide, also in Africa.43 Pointing in particular to
the ongoing work of the OAU, Dr Schnyder emphasized that regional instru-
ments “should not in any way supplant the 1951 [Refugee] Convention”.44
He went on to highlight the importance of bringing the status of refugees
in Asia and Africa into line with the treatment of refugees covered by the
UN Refugee Convention, so as to make the latter a “truly universal docu-
ment”.45 UNHCR, in parallel, was also contributing to the negotiations leading
to the OAU Refugee Convention. Its involvement finally led to the OAU
Refugee Convention taking a form complementary to the UN Refugee
Convention, thereby ensuring the relevance of a rather European-led refugee
law system over a (more progressive) regional instrument.46
Aprotocol to theUNRefugeeConventionwas formallyadoptedby theUNon31
January 1967 and entered into force in October of the same year (1967 Protocol).
While the substance of the refugee definition remained identical, the 1967
Protocol removed the temporal and geographic limitations from the convention.
AFRICAN REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON REFUGEE PROTECTION:
THEIR IMPACT IN THE REGION AND BEYOND
In addition to their contributions to the drafting of the UN Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol, African states have established regional
42 Einarsen “Drafting history”, above at note 17 at 70. See also A Corkery “The contribution
of the UNHCR Executive Committee to the development of international refugee law”
(2006) 13 Australian International Law Journal 97 at 101.
43 Ibid.
44 Id at 71.
45 Ibid. UNHCR has reiterated the primacy of the UN Refugee Convention over the years.
For instance, in 2001, the ExCom “recogniz[ed] the enduring importance of the 1951
Convention, as the primary refugee protection instrument”: “Agenda for protection”
(GA, 26 June 2002), UN doc A/AC.96/965/Add.1, para 2, available at: <https://www.
unhcr.org/3d3e61b84.pdf> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
46 The OAU Refugee Convention was finally expressed to be complementary to the UN
Refugee Convention. Art 8(1) states that the convention “shall be the effective regional
complement in Africa” to the UN Refugee Convention. This is reaffirmed in recital 9
of the preamble, which acknowledges that the UN Refugee Convention, as modified
by the 1967 Protocol, “constitute[s] the basic and universal instrument relating to the sta-
tus of refugees”. On the complementary nature of the OAU Refugee Convention to the
UN Refugee Convention, see, for example, C Lewis UNHCR and International Refugee
Law: From Treaties to Innovation (2012, Routledge Research in International Law) at 78–
79; Viljoen “Africa’s contribution”, above at note 16 at 25–28; V Türk “The role of
UNHCR in the development of international refugee law” in F Nicholson and P
Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes
(1999, Cambridge University Press) 153 at 167.
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instruments to address matters of particular concern to the refugee situation
in their region and that reflect their interests.47 Among the most significant
contributions of these instruments are the expanded refugee definition, the
recognition of the principle of non-refoulement in its widest sense, and the
emphasis on the voluntary character of repatriation.48 These contributions
are not only reflected in the OAU Refugee Convention, but also in earlier
supra-national instruments, particularly the Bangkok Principles. Against this
background, this section provides a brief overview of a number of significant
areas in which the stipulations adopted by these instruments can be consid-
ered to be unprecedented. In doing so, it illuminates the extent to which
they have contributed to the development of refugee law in the region and
beyond.
The Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees
The subject of refugee protection had been on the agenda of the AALCC since
its sixth session, held in Cairo in 1964 following a reference made by the only
African member of the AALCC at that time: the government of Egypt.49 After a
lengthy debate and discussion, the AALCC formulated a set of principles on
the “Status and Treatment of Refugees”, commonly referred to as the
Bangkok Principles, which were adopted unanimously by AALCC member
states at its eighth session held in Bangkok in 1966.50
Among the most important provisions of the Bangkok Principles is the one
found in article III(3), which recognizes the applicability of the principle of
non-refoulement in its widest sense. While this provision listed exceptions to
the non-refoulement obligation for reasons of national security and safeguard-
ing populations, it expanded the scope of the principle of non-refoulement
found in the UN Refugee Convention by expressly granting protection against
rejection at a frontier. This provision may be viewed as a precursor to the
inclusion of the principle of non-refoulement in its widest sense in both the
OAU Refugee Convention51 and a universal instrument, namely the 1967 UN
Declaration on Territorial Asylum.52 The latter instrument similarly included
among its provisions the prohibition of rejection at the frontier where the
47 See A Onayemi and O Elias “Aspects of Africa’s contribution to the development of inter-
national law” in C Jalloh and O Elias (eds) Shielding Humanity: Essays in International Law in
Honour of Judge Abdul G Koroma (2015, Brill) 591.
48 See, for example, R Hofmann “Refugee law in the African context” (1992) 52 Heidelberg
Journal of International Law 318 at 328.
49 “Status and treatment of refugees”, above at note 4 at 1.
50 S Sucharitkul “Contribution of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization to the
codification and progressive development of international law” in Essays in International
Law (2007, AALCO) 9 at 16.
51 The OAU Refugee Convention, art 2(3) is the first supranational provision to give expres-
sion in binding form to the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement in this widest
sense.
52 See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 1967, art 3(1).
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individual “may be subjected to persecution”.53 Although neither the princi-
ples nor the declaration are legally binding, since their adoption, the unifica-
tion of the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement has led to the
(contested)54 establishment of new customary rules of international law, creat-
ing new obligations for states.55
Following recommendations of the Manila Seminar in 199656 and the
Tehran Meeting of Experts in 1998,57 AALCC member states decided to
re-examine the Bangkok Principles in view of developments in law and prac-
tice in Africa and Asia since the adoption of the principles in 1966. The
Bangkok Principles were revised at the AALCC’s 39th session in 2000,58 with
the revised version (2001 Bangkok Principles) finally adopted at its 40th session
on 24 June 2001 in New Delhi.59 The 2001 Bangkok Principles were the result
of, inter alia, consultations with UNHCR as well as comments submitted by
individual AALCC member states during inter-sessional consultations between
1997 and 1999.60 Some member states proposed specific amendments to the
refugee definition, suggesting an expanded definition in light of other
53 Ibid. See Sucharitkul “Contribution of the Asian-African Legal Consultative”, above at
note 50 at 16.
54 Among the very few legal writers who do not agree with this is JC Hathaway The Rights of
Refugees under International Law (2010, Cambridge University Press) at 363–70.
55 This, as explicitly stated by the drafters of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum, was
their will. See G Goodwin-Gill “The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum” (2012) United
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 1 at 6, citing A/6912 (1967) (a report of the
sixth committee of the General Assembly that considered the Draft Declaration on
Territorial Asylum). The extraterritorial application of non-refoulement has been consoli-
dated through the case law of regional courts and human rights bodies. See, for
example: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy appln no 27765/09, judgment of 23 February
2012; JHA v Spain CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, 21 November 2008; The Haitian Center for
Human Rights et al v United States (decision) Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, C No 10.675 (13 March 1997), paras 163 and 182; Delia Saldias de López v
Uruguay CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, para 12.2.
56 This seminar was held in Manila on 11–13 December 1996. Among other items, delegates
decided to re-examine the Bangkok Principles in the light of developments in law and
practice in the Afro-Asian region since 1966: “Status and treatment of refugees”, above
at note 4 at 1.
57 This meeting was held in Tehran on 11–12 March 1998 to discuss “the need to reconcile
the fundamental interests of states and the humanitarian obligations of states to protect
refugees”: “Status and treatment of refugees”, id at 1–2.
58 Sucharitkul “Contribution of the Asian-African Legal Consultative”, above at note 50 at
16.
59 Ibid.
60 “Status and treatment of refugees”, above at note 4 at 10. See also “Final text of the
AALCO’s 1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees: As adopted on
24 June 2001 at the AALCO’S 40th session, New Delhi”, available at: <https://www.
refworld.org/docid/3de5f2d52.htmlhttp://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5f2d52.html> (last
accessed 28 December 2020).
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regional and international instruments, particularly the OAU Refugee
Convention.61
For instance, Ghana’s delegate proposed a broader refugee definition that
included persons fleeing generalized violence or massive violations of
human rights.62 Uganda’s delegate proposed expanding the definition of refu-
gees to cover those persecuted on the ground of “colour”.63 The latter proposal
found recognition in article I(1), which, apart from the five grounds listed in
article 1A(2) of the UN Refugee Convention and article 1(1) of the OAU Refugee
Convention, also includes the grounds of colour, ethnic origin and gender.64
Moreover, the 2001 Bangkok Principles set forth an extended refugee defin-
ition, similar to that in the OAU Refugee Convention. Indeed, article I(2)
made the term “refugee” also applicable to individuals forced to leave their
place of habitual residence “owing to external occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disturbing public order”. The addition of the OAU Refugee
Convention was recommended both at the Manila Seminar and the Tehran
Meeting of Experts.65 The OAU Refugee Convention also influenced the inclu-
sion and amendment of other provisions of the 2001 Bangkok Principles, in
particular the provisions contained in: article I(7) on exclusion clauses;66 art-
icle II(3) on the right to asylum;67 article IV(5) on the principle of non-
discrimination;68 article VII on voluntary repatriation;69 and article VIII on
co-operation with international organizations.70 It should be emphasized
that the 2001 Bangkok Principles further contained the far-reaching right to
61 Ibid.
62 Ghana’s proposed refugee definition read: “A refugee is a person who … [i]s outside the
country of his nationality and is unwilling or cannot, for the time being, return to his
home country because his life, freedom or personal security would be at risk there;
the risk emanating from a pattern of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and / or from general-
ized violence (international war, internal armed conflict, foreign aggression or occupation, severe
disruption of public order) or from massive violations of human rights in the whole or part of
the country of nationality” (emphasis added): “Status and treatment of refugees”, above
at note 4 at 23–24.
63 Id at 24.
64 Ibid.
65 See id at 12, footnote 19.
66 The phrase “as defined in international instruments drawn up to make provisions in
respect of such crimes” (which derives from the OAU Refugee Convention, art 1(5)(a))
was added to the 2001 Bangkok Principles, art I(7): id at 14, footnotes 19 and 20.
67 Art II(3) derives from the OAU Refugee Convention, art 2(2) and the UN Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, preamble. It reads: “The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful
and humanitarian act”: id at 15, footnote 24.
68 Art IV(5) derives partially from: the OAU Refugee Convention, art 4; the UN Refugee
Convention, art 3; and the Manila Seminar, recommendation (d): id at 16, footnote 37.
69 Art VII was a new addition to the 2001 Bangkok Principles taken from the OAU Refugee
Convention: id at 20, footnote 60.
70 Art VIII derives from: the OAU Refugee Convention, art 8(1); the UN Refugee Convention,
art 35; and the 1967 Protocol, art 2: id at 23, footnote 81.
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compensation from the country of origin that the refugee left or to which he
or she is unable to return, which appears to be inspired by the historical cases
of compensation and restitution from Germany and Uganda.71
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa
The OAU Refugee Convention reproduces, in substance, the provisions of the
UN Refugee Convention and its subsequent 1967 Protocol. However, it also
incorporates significant developments, some of which were referred to in
the previous section of this article. First, it specifically reaffirms the import-
ance of the institution of asylum,72 the exercise of which is defined as a “peace-
ful and humanitarian act”.73 Secondly, it increases the scope of protection by
extending the protection against refoulement to encompass frontiers.74 It also
expands on the 1951 definition of refugee to include those “compelled to
leave … owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or
events seriously disturbing the public order”.75 In contrast to the refugee def-
inition in the UN Refugee Convention, the OAU definition of refugee in article
1(2) does not speak of the subjective fear of the individual but reflects objective
criteria. Despite suggestions to the contrary,76 most commentators, including
71 Id at 19, footnote 56. On this topic see LT Lee “The right to compensation: Refugees and
countries of asylum” (1986) 80 American Journal of International Law 532; International
Law Association “Report of the sixty-fifth conference held at Cairo, Egypt 21 to 26
April 1992” (Cairo, 1993).
72 Art 11(1) states: “Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent
with their respective legislation to receive refugees”. While this wording does not
imply the right to be granted asylum, this provision is supported by the African
Charter, art 12(3), which states that, “every individual shall have the right, when perse-
cuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those
countries and international conventions” (emphasis added). On the right to seek and
obtain asylum, see, for example, C Beyani Protection of the Right to Seek and Obtain
Asylum under the African Human Rights System (2013, Martinus Nijhoff).
73 OAU Refugee Convention, art 11(2).
74 Id, art 2(3).
75 Id, art 1(2). It has been suggested that “events seriously disturbing or disrupting public
order” also includes any man-made event, including armed conflicts. See Sharpe’s refer-
ence to the opinions of Edwards et al in Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 49–
50. See also JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (1991, Butterworths) at 16–19; Arboleda
“Refugee definition”, above at note 38 at 194; and UNHCR “Protection mechanisms out-
side of the 1951 Convention (‘complementary protection’)” (June 2005), UN doc
PPLA/2005/02 at 45, footnote 145. However, the OAU Refugee Convention, art 1 adds fur-
ther grounds for exclusion from refugee status and cessation of refugee status to those
stipulated by the UN Refugee Convention, thereby narrowing the scope of the broader
refugee definition.
76 Edwards moves away from this rather settled opinion by arguing that the OAU definition
of refugee “is framed in terms of individual status”, which thus “necessitates inquiring
into the individual or subjective reasons for flight of each applicant”: A Edwards
“Refugee status determination in Africa” (2006) 14 African Journal of International &
Comparative Law 204 at 228–30. A 2015 judicial review by Sharpe of South Africa’s High
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Opoku-Awuku, Rwelamira, Oloka-Onyango and Arboleda, maintain that the
words “compelled to leave” require an objective inquiry into the nature of
the conditions in the country of origin.77 This interpretation, in turn, has
led to the (contested) argument that the OAU refugee definition explicitly
sets forth the legal basis for accepting “mass” influxes (resulting from, for
example, armed conflicts) upon determination of the status of a “group”.78
In Rutinwa’s view, the “qualities” of the OAU extended definition lie not in
its wider scope but in defining a refugee in such terms that would make it eas-
ier to determine if an individual qualifies as a refugee.79 Thirdly, the OAU
Refugee Convention includes, among the provisions regulating durable solu-
tions, respect for the voluntary character of repatriation.80 These
contd
Court shows that, in determining whether an individual qualifies as a refugee under
South Africa’s equivalent of the OAU Refugee Convention, art 1(2), the test employed
is “predominantly objective in character” but also demands an assessment of the indivi-
dual’s personal circumstances. Sharpe’s overall assessment of the meaning of the terms
“compelled to leave” calls into question the sufficiency of determining refugee status on
a purely objective basis. See Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 55–60.
77 MR Rwelamira “Two decades of the 1969 OAU Convention on the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa” (1989) 1/4 International Journal of Refugee Law 557 at 558; E
Opoku-Awuku “Refugee movements in Africa and the OAU Convention on Refugees”
(1995) 39/1 Journal of African Law 79 at 81; E Arboleda “The Cartagena Declaration of
1984 and its similarities to the 1969 OAU Convention: A comparative perspective”
(1995) International Journal of Refugee Law 87 at 94; J Oloka-Onyango “Human rights, the
OAU Convention and the refugee crisis in Africa: Forty years after Geneva” (1991) 3
International Journal of Refugee Law 453 at 455. See also J Turner “Liberian refugees: A
test of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa” (1994) 8 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 281 at 285.
78 P Nobel “Refugees, law, and development in Africa” (1982) 3/1 Michigan Journal of
International Law 255 at 262; Rwelamira “Two decades”, id at 559. See also Sharpe The
Regional Law, above at note 39 at 59–60. In contrast to this view, Edwards argues that
the OAU Refugee Convention does not provide a mechanism for group determination
of refugee status. While she identifies that group or prima facie recognition has been
the approach of most African governments to refugee situations in Africa, she argues
that such ability “has been wrongly derived from the OAU Convention”: Edwards
“Refugee status determination”, above at note 76 at 228.
79 B Rutinwa “Relationship between the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU
Convention on Refugees” in V Türk, A Edwards and C Wouters (eds) In Flight from
Conflict and Violence: UNHCR’s Consultations on Refugee Status and Other Forms of
International Protection (2017, Cambridge University Press) 94 at 115. Yet, while the UN
Refugee Convention contains no provisions regarding “mass” influx, Durieux,
McAdam and Jackson are of the opinion that this does not mean that the UN Refugee
Convention is not applicable in cases of large-scale displacement. See IC Jackson The
Refugee Concept in Group Situations (1999, Martinus Nijhoff); JF Durieux and J McAdam
“Non-refoulement through time: The case for a derogation clause to the Refugee
Convention in mass influx emergencies” (2004) 16/1 International Journal of Refugee Law
4 at 9. See also Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 66–67.
80 OAU Refugee Convention, art 5. UNHCR “Issues and challenges in international protec-
tion in Africa” (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 55 at 58.
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developments have been the subject of extensive scholarly debate, so a deeper
analysis of them need not detain us.81 Rather, this section focuses on the OAU
Refugee Convention’s global influence and contribution to the progressive
development of international refugee law.
Apart from its impact on the 2001 Bangkok Principles,82 the influence of the
OAU Refugee Convention is also apparent in other international and regional
instruments. For instance, the OAU Refugee Convention has informed the
scope of UNHCR’s mandate and its “concept of persons in need of inter-
national protection”.83 Indeed, UNHCR extended its mandate to cover persons
who do not fall within the terms of the UN Refugee Convention or the UNHCR
Statute but who nevertheless are in need of international protection, includ-
ing individuals fleeing armed conflict or serious and generalized disorder
and violence.84 Furthermore, the concept of serious public disorder in
UNHCR’s formulation is drawn from the language found in the OAU refugee
definition.85 In a 1991 report of its Working Group on Solutions and
Protection, the ExCom recommended that, “[t]he question of a possible appli-
cation on a global basis of a refugee definition applicable to persons not pro-
tected by the UN Refugee Convention / 1967 Protocol or by regional
instruments could be considered further”.86 Among the groups identified in
the report were persons forced to leave or prevented from returning because
of “man-made disasters”, “natural or ecological disaster” or “extreme
81 See, for example, Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 34–83; J van Garderen and J
Ebenstein “Background, regional developments: Africa” in Zimmermann (ed) 1951
Convention, above at note 6, 186; Rankin “Extending the limits”, above at note 34; A
Tuepker “On the threshold of Africa: OAU and UN definitions in South African asylum
practice” (2002) 15/4 Journal of Refugee Studies 409; G Okoth-Obbo “30 Years On: A legal
perspective of the 1969 OAU Convention Refugee Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa” (2001) 20/1 Refugee Survey Quarterly 81; UNHCR
“Issues and challenges”, above at note 80; Hofmann “Refugee law”, above at note 48;
Arboleda “Refugee definition”, above at note 38; Rwelamira “Two decades”, above at
note 77; Nobel “Refugees, law, and development”, above at note 78.
82 The Bangkok Principles are of little significance in terms of the legal obligations placed
on African states, as most of them are parties to the OAU Refugee Convention. Yet, their
relevance lies in their “role” in Asia, where very few states are contracting parties to the
UN Refugee Convention and / or 1967 Protocol.
83 UNHCR “Protection mechanisms outside”, above at note 75 at 12.
84 “Note on international protection (submitted by the High Commissioner)” (UNHCR, 31
July 1981), UN doc A/AC.96/593, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/do
cid/3ae68bff10.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020); “UNHCR and international pro-
tection: A protection induction programme” (UNHCR, 30 June 2006) at 22. See also
Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 37; Lewis UNHCR and International Refugee
Law, above at note 46 at 127; G Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law (2nd ed,
1996, Clarendon) at 8–18.
85 UNHCR “Protection mechanisms outside”, above at note 75 at 44.
86 “Report of the Working Group on Solutions and Protection to the 42nd session of the
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme” (UNHCR, 12 August
1991), UN doc EC/SCP/64, para 55(c).
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poverty”.87 There was also an exchange of views as to whether the respective
definitions of a refugee in the OAU Refugee Convention and the 1984
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration)88 could be
included in an additional protocol to the UN Refugee Convention or, as a
first step, in a UN General Assembly (GA) resolution.89 There was, however,
no unanimity on the need for making these regional definitions universal.90
Later, in 1994, to clarify the scope of UNHCR’s mandate, the High
Commissioner at that time explained that the office had adopted the “usage
of regional instruments such as the OAU Refugee Convention and the
Cartagena Declaration, using the term ‘refugee’ in the broader sense”.91
Presently, when UNHCR conducts refugee status determination pursuant to
its mandate, it considers as refugees not only those who meet the UN
Refugee Convention definition, but also individuals covered by the OAU
Refugee Convention.92
Further, ExCom’s Conclusion No 22 of 21 October 1981 noted that the fun-
damental “principle of non-refoulement - including non-rejection at the frontier
- must be scrupulously observed”.93 Although without attribution, this word-
ing clearly mirrors the language of article 2(3) of the OAU Refugee Convention.
While ExCom conclusions are not legally binding, they are generally accepted
as constituting “soft law”, which aids in the interpretation and application of
refugee legal instruments.94
Beyond UNHCR, the contribution of the OAU Refugee Convention has been
affirmed in, for example, GA resolution 54/147 of 22 February 2000 on
87 Id, paras 32–35.
88 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International
Protection on Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama, held in Cartagena,
19–22 November 1984.
89 “Report of the Working Group”, above at note 86, para 25.
90 Ibid.
91 Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 37–38.
92 Id at 38.
93 “Protection of asylum-seekers in situations of large-scale influx: No 22 (XXXII) - 1981”
(ExCom, 21 October 1981), UN doc A/36/12/Add.1, sec II, para 2, available at: <https://
www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/3ae68c6e10/protection-asylum-seekers-situations-large-
scale-influx.html> (last accessed 28 December 2020). See also: ExCom Conclusion No 6
(XXVIII) reaffirming “the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle
of non-refoulement - both at the border and within the territory of a State”; and
ExCom Conclusion No 15 (XXX), stating: “It is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal
States to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters and to grant asylum, or at
least temporary refuge, to persons on board wishing to seek asylum.”
94 UNHCR’s approach to some aspects of international refugee law (such as the extraterri-
torial application of the principle of non-refoulement) has been consolidated through the
case law of courts around the world. Its approach to this topic, which drew from the
OAU Refugee Convention and is further based on state practice and jurisprudence world-
wide, provides evidence of a customary rule. See Corkery “The contribution of the
UNHCR”, above at note 42 at 118–19.
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assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa.95 On the 50th
anniversary the UN Refugee Convention, a Declaration of States Parties was
adopted unanimously in 2001, which emphasized the importance of the
OAU Refugee Convention.96 A reference to this regional refugee protection
instrument is also found in the New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants adopted in 2016.97
The OAU Refugee Convention has further contributed to the development
of specific aspects of other regional instruments. Refugee law scholarship
strongly suggests that the Cartagena Declaration drew inspiration from the
OAU Refugee Convention.98 This is reflected in the negotiations leading to
the Cartagena Declaration and in the final text itself. In 1981, a colloquium
on the subject of “Asylum and the International Protection of Refugees” was
held in Mexico under the auspices of UNHCR. ExCom Conclusion No 4 speci-
fied the need for a “more encompassing refugee definition” to deal with the
most immediate consequences presented by the regional crisis in Central
America.99 In addition to the individuals falling within the definition of
“the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol”, the Cartagena Declaration
includes among refugees: “persons who have fled their country because
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence,
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.100
In the words of Eduardo Arboleda, former legal adviser at UNHCR Canada,
this definition “basically reiterated the language of the 1969 OAU
Convention and added ‘massive violations of human rights’ to the conditions
defining a refugee”.101 The declaration itself expressly refers to the “precedent”
of article 1(2) of the OAU Refugee Convention and to the doctrine of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as inspiring the language in
95 UNHCR “Protection mechanisms outside”, above at note 75 at 14–15.
96 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and / or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 13 December 2001) in “Report of the ministerial meeting
of states parties to the 1951 Convention and / or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees (Geneva, 12–13 December 2001), UN doc HCR/MMSP/2001/10”, preamble,
recital 2.
97 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (GA res, 3 October 2016), A/RES/71/1.
98 See, for example, S Kneebone and F Rawlings-Sanaei “Regionalism as a response to a glo-
bal challenge” in S Kneebone and F Rawlings-Sanaei (eds) New Regionalism and
Asylum-Seekers: Challenges Ahead (2007, Berghahn Books) 1 at 8; Arboleda “Refugee defin-
ition”, above at note 38 at 202; Arboleda “The Cartagena Declaration”, above at note 77.
This view is also shared by UNHCR: “Guidelines on international protection No 12:
Claims for refugee status related to situations of armed conflict and violence under art-
icle 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and / or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the regional refugee definitions” (UNHCR, 2 December 2016), UN doc
HCR/GIP/16/12 at 13.
99 Arboleda “Refugee definition”, above at note 38 at 206.
100 Cartagena Declaration, art III(3).
101 Arboleda “Refugee definition”, above at note 38 at 202.
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its refugee definition. ExCom Conclusion III(3) states: “it is necessary to con-
sider enlarging the concept of a refugee, bearing in mind, as far as appropriate
and in the light of the situation prevailing in the region, the precedent of the
OAU Convention (article 1, paragraph 2) and the doctrine employed in the
reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”.102 This in
turn reflects that the OAU Refugee Convention was a direct inspiration for
the Cartagena Declaration’s refugee definition. While the regional declaration
is not binding, 13 Latin American states have incorporated its provisions into
their domestic legislation. Interestingly, Belize decided to incorporate the OAU
refugee definition instead of the one contained in the Cartagena Declaration
into its Refugees Act of 1991.103
Similarly, article 1(2) of the OAU Refugee Convention influenced the way in
which refugees are defined in the League of Arab States’ Arab Convention on
Regulating Status of Refugees (not yet in force) in Arab countries. In addition
to the UN Refugee Convention definition, this definition also considers as
refugees individuals who “unwillingly [take] refuge … because of sustained
aggression against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or
because of the occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in
major disruption of public order in the whole country or any part thereof”.104
In contrast, the European Union (EU), through the adoption of supra-
national legislation (namely the Qualification Directive of 29 April 2004), desig-
nated a subsidiary regime for certain individuals who do not qualify for
refugee status under the UN Refugee Convention (as amended by the 1967
Protocol) but who do, however, fall under the protection of non-refoulement.105
During the drafting process of the directive, reference was made to, inter alia,
the evolution of UNHCR’s mandate (which, as explained above, was partly
informed by the OAU Refugee Convention) and regional developments such
as the OAU Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, as arguments
for including “people threatened by indiscriminate violence and massive
human rights violations” within the protection regime.106 The European
Commission initially considered the option of having a “single status
102 In the words of Eduardo Arboleda, former legal adviser at UNHCR Canada, “this conclu-
sion basically reiterated the language of the 1969 OAU Convention and added ‘massive
violations of human rights’ to the conditions defining a refugee”: ibid.
103 Now the Refugees Act of 2000 (Belize), chap 165 (31 December 2000), art 4(1)(c). See also
Sharpe The Regional Law, above at note 39 at 36–37; Arboleda “The Cartagena
Declaration”, above at note 77 at 98.
104 Sharpe, id at 37.
105 Art 2(f) of Directive 2011/95/EU (previously Directive 2004/83/EC) on Standards for the
Qualification of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of
International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for
Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (recast) [2011] OJ
L 337/9 (Recast Qualification Directive).
106 “UNHCR statement on subsidiary protection under the EC Qualification Directive for
People Threatened by Indiscriminate Violence” (UNHCR, January 2008) at 14, available
at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/479df7472.pdf> (last accessed 28 December 2020).
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conferring the same types of rights” recognized under the UN Refugee
Convention.107 Later in the drafting process, it opted to codify two separate sta-
tuses: refugee status and subsidiary protection.108 The latter is granted to indi-
viduals who do not qualify for refugee status but who “would face a real risk of
suffering serious harm”.109 However, it does not bring all the guarantees of
refugee status.110 The Qualification Directive indeed allows EU member states
to grant fewer rights, both in terms of quantity and quality, to subsidiary pro-
tection beneficiaries.111 Importantly, the concepts employed in defining “ser-
ious harm” in article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive are similar to those
used in the OAU Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, to the
extent that these relate to situations of indiscriminate violence. In particular,
this provision states that serious harm consists of a “serious and individual
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate …”.112 Under art-
icle 15(a)(b), “serious harm” also includes “the death penalty or execution” and
“torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. While the first
two paragraphs reflect EU member states’ human rights obligations under
regional and international human rights instruments,113 in Mandal’s words,
the third “cannot be traced to language found in a specific universal or
regional human rights instrument”.114 Instead, it reflects more the concepts
found in the OAU Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration.115
107 European Commission “Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status,
valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum” (20 November 2000),
COM/2000/0755 final, para 3.2.3.
108 Ibid. See also MT Gill Gazo “Refugee protection under international human rights law:
From non-refoulement to residence and citizenship” (2015) 34 Refugee Survey Quarterly 11
at 26.
109 Recast Qualification Directive, above at note 105, art 2(f).
110 For a discussion on this, see, for example, C Bauloz and G Ruiz “Refugee status and sub-
sidiary protection: Towards a uniform concept of international protection?” in V Chetail
et al (eds) Reforming the Common European Asylum System (2016, Brill) 240.
111 See Recast Qualification Directive, above at note 105, chap VII. On that basis, many EU
states have opted to subject holders of subsidiary protection to less preferential treat-
ment than holders of refugee status.
112 Emphasis added.
113 Namely: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, and its Protocol No 6 Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 1983; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984; and the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 1989.
114 UNHCR “Protection mechanisms outside”, above at note 75 at 18.
115 Ibid. McAdam notes that the words “indiscriminate violence” in article 15(c) reflect “in
part Member States’ obligations under the Temporary Protection Directive … as well
as EU Member States’ repeated support for UNHCR’s mandate activities for victims of
indiscriminate violence (linked to other regional agreements such as the OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration”: J McAdam Complementary Protection in
International Refugee Law (2007, Oxford University Press) at 71.
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It therefore appears clear that Africa’s contributions to the codification of
regional norms in the area of refugee protection have influenced subsequent
legal developments beyond the confines of Africa. Moreover, some of the pro-
visions of the OAU Refugee Convention may provide evidence of customary
rules of international law,116 which have to be taken into account when inter-
preting and applying other international and regional legal instruments in
this field of law. In the words of Pinto de Albuquerque, a judge of the
European Court of Human Rights, “international refugee law has evolved by
assimilating broader human rights standard[s] and thus enlarging the
Convention concept of refugee… to other individuals who are in need of com-
plementary international protection” as covered inter alia by articles 1 and 2 of
the OAU Refugee Convention.117
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS (PROGRESSIVE)
APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW
The OAU Refugee Convention constitutes “the first treaty with a human rights
focus” adopted under the umbrella of the OAU.118 While the title does not
speak of human rights, its provisions create subjective rights and impose
duties on state parties.119 For instance, the OAU Refugee Convention is explicit
about the duty of OAU member states “to use their best endeavours … to
receive refugees”.120 Moreover, during the Pan-African Conference on
Refugees held in Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979 (commonly referred to as
the Arusha Conference), delegates confirmed that refugee law is part of
human rights in the broader sense.121
In addition to the OAU Refugee Convention, other human rights instru-
ments have been adopted under the auspices of the African Union and its pre-
decessor, the OAU, which have further elaborated upon the rights of refugees
and asylum-seekers in Africa.122 Importantly, the African Charter, which was
116 See DJ Cantor and F Chikwanha “Reconsidering African refugee law” (2019) 31/2–3
International Journal of Refugee Law 182 at 245, arguing that widely adopted rules in
African national refugee laws “have the potential to contribute to customary formation
at the global level”.
117 Hirsi Jamaa, above at note 55, concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.
118 G Bekker “The protection of asylum seekers and refugees within the African regional
human rights system” (2013) 13 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 1.
119 On this approach, see LaGrand, Germany v United States of America, ICJ judgment of 27 June
2001.
120 OAU Refugee Convention, art 2(1). In contrast to this view, Weis claims that this require-
ment is recommendatory, rather than binding on states: Weis “The Convention of the
Organisation”, above at note 34 at 457.
121 The conference was attended by 39 OAU member states: Nobel “Refugees, law, and devel-
opment”, above at note 78 at 262.
122 For a brief study of the current legal framework for the promotion and protection of
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adopted in 1981, recognizes the right “to seek and obtain asylum”.123 It also
provided for the creation of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) to oversee the implementation of the
African Charter.124 Additionally, the 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, estab-
lished the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) in
order to “complement” the protective mandate of the African Commission.125
Pursuant to this protocol, the African Court has jurisdiction to deal with all
cases and disputes submitted to it regarding the interpretation and application
of the African Charter and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified
by the concerned states,126 as well as jurisdiction to provide an opinion on any
legal matter relating to these instruments.127 Another major addition to the
African human rights system was the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter), adopted in 1990, which pro-
vides special protection measures for refugee children and internally displaced
children.128 It also created the African Committee of Experts on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) to oversee its implementation.129 Lastly,
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol) was adopted in 2003.
This instrument also includes special protection measures for refugee
women,130 and entrusted its supervision to the African Commission and
African Court.131
The following sections of this article take a non-exhaustive look at some of
the authoritative pronouncements made by the African Commission and
African Court in relation to the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees within
the African human rights system, in so far as they adopt a progressive
approach to the interpretation of their rights.132
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Recourse to the African Commission enables refugees and asylum-seekers to
bring claims against the host country where refugee law is inadequate or
contd
human rights in Africa, see Bekker “The protection of asylum seekers”, above note at 118
at 3–7.
123 African Charter, art 12(3).
124 See id, art 2.
125 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, 1998, art 8.
126 Id, art 3.
127 Id, art 4.
128 African Children’s Charter, art 23.
129 Id, chap II.
130 African Women’s Protocol, arts 4(2)(k), 10(2)(c)(d) and 11(3).
131 Id, arts 26 and 27.
132 For a comprehensive analysis of this jurisprudence up to 2013, see Bekker “The protec-
tion of asylum seekers”, above note at 118 at 9–29.
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not respected. Moreover, the commission, in the case of Rencontre Africaine
Pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia, reasoned that recourse to the
African Commission applies to non-nationals.133 Importantly, the African
Commission has allowed claims against countries of origin on the basis of con-
tinuing violations of their rights based on persecution and flight to other
states.134
Of particular note is the African Commission’s approach towards the inter-
pretation of article 5 of the African Charter on the right to respect of dig-
nity,135 in so far as it has interpreted this provision to include guarantees of
social and economic rights. For instance, in Sudan Human Rights Organisation
& Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, the African
Commission elaborated on the state obligations in instances of voluntary
repatriation. In doing so, the African Commission required states to adopt
all necessary measures to ensure protection, including “economic and social
infrastructure, such as education, health, water, and agricultural services”,
in order to provide “conditions for return in safety and dignity” for internally
displaced persons and refugees.136 In the absence of an express provision regu-
lating the right to housing within the African Charter, the African
Commission has interpreted the provisions on human dignity and the prohib-
ition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as encompassing
such a guarantee. In The Nubian Community in Kenya v Kenya, the African
Commission held that the rights to “citizenship or nationality as a legal status
is protected under Article 5 of the [African Charter]”.137
In situations of expulsion or deportation, the African Commission consid-
ered that, “it is unacceptable to deport individuals without giving them the
possibility to plead their case before the competent national courts as this is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the [African Charter] and international
law”.138 It has also maintained consistently that the guarantees of due process
must be applied in the context of proceedings on the expulsion of refugees.139
133 Comm no 71/92, October 1996, para 52.
134 Comm no 232/99, John D Ouko v Kenya, 2000, para 144 (emphasis added). The African
Commission, by linking the claimant’s refugee status to the exhaustion of domestic rem-
edies requirement, held that, “the complainant is unable to pursue any domestic rem-
edy following his flight to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for fear of his life,
and his subsequent recognition as a refugee by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees”: id, para 19.
135 African Charter, art 5 states: “Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All
forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.”
136 Comm no 279/03-296/05, 16–17 May 2019, para 229(5) (emphasis added).
137 Comm no 317/06, 30 May 2006.
138 Comm no 159/96, 22nd ordinary session, 11 November 1997, para 20.
139 Comm no 313/05, Kenneth Good v Botswana, 47th ordinary session, 12–26 May 2010, paras
160–80; comm nos 27/89, 46/91, 49/91 and 99/93, Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture
and Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, Commission Internationale des Juristes
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Notably, in the case of Familia Pacheco Tineo v Bolivia, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights endorsed these pronouncements, thereby determining that,
“in proceedings such as those that may result in the expulsion or deportation
of aliens” the guarantees of due process continue to apply.140
Most recently, in its General Comment No 5 (2019), the African Commission
elaborated on the right to freedom of movement and residence. The African
Commission emphasized that this applies to every individual, including refu-
gees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons and undocumented
migrants.141 This is in line with the African Commission’s earlier position
that the guarantee of non-discrimination in article 2 extends the protection
afforded by the wider set of rights in the African Charter to everyone within
the jurisdiction of member states, ie nationals as well as non-nationals.142 It
went on to reason that the right to move freely within a state not only “encom-
passes the prerogative to move around within a state without arbitrary con-
finement of movement” but also “imposes a duty on the state not to
interfere with the enjoyment of the free movement of individuals”.143 In
doing so, it emphasized that it is “crucial” that states afford “the same standard
of protection” to asylum-seekers.144 The African Commission further argued
that this right intersects with several other rights, including the right to lib-
erty protected under article 6 of the African Charter,145 and that it should
be treated as essential to human life.146
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Court, together with the EU Court of Justice and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, are the only supranational tribunals
that could interpret the provisions of the UN Refugee Convention and its
1967 Protocol.147 Indeed, these tribunals supervise regional human rights
instruments that make explicit reference to the UN Refugee Convention.148
contd
(CIJ), Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Rwanda, 20th ordinary session, 21–31
October 1996, para 4.
140 Judgment, 2013, series C no 272, para 132.
141 General Comment No 5 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right
to Freedom of Movement and Residence (Article 12(1)) (2019) at 7.
142 Comm no 71/92, above at note 133.
143 General Comment No 5, above at note 141 at 3.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Id at 60.
147 See, for example, H Lambert “Introduction: European refugee law and transitional emu-
lation” in H Lambert, J McAdam and M Fuellerton (eds) The Global Reach of European
Refugee Law (2013, Cambridge University Press) 1 at 18.
148 While the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, does not make explicit refer-
ence to the UN Refugee Convention, its art 22(7) states that “every person has the right to
seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with … international con-
ventions” (emphasis added).
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Their jurisprudence, thus, is not only informative but also has a legal role in
interpretating the UN Refugee Convention. They have the power to fill some of
the gaps posed by this instrument. It should be recalled that there exists no
specialized treaty body under the UN Refugee Convention that would be
able to provide an authoritative interpretation of its terms.149 While
UNHCR, pursuant to article 35 of the UN Refugee Convention and the
UNHCR Statute, has a “supervisory role” with respect to the UN Refugee
Convention, it lacks binding force. To date, however, there is no case law
from the African Court that examines the OAU Refugee Convention or the
UN Refugee Convention.150
In Anudo Ochieng Anudo v Republic of Tanzania, the African Court dealt for the
first time with the right to nationality.151 While it does not directly address
the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, this case provides important guid-
ance on issues of nationality and statelessness. In doing so, the court comple-
mented earlier jurisprudence from the African Commission152 and the
ACERWC.153 First and foremost, the court went on to rule that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is part of customary international
law,154 thereby holding that Tanzania had violated the applicant’s right not
to be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality under the UDHR.155 The African
Court, however, missed the opportunity to endorse and further elaborate
upon the African Commission’s position that “a claim to citizenship or nation-
ality as a legal status is protected under Article 5 of the [African Charter]”.156
Nonetheless, the assertion that the UDHR (and in particular the right to a
nationality) is customary international law is, in the words of Bronwen
Manby, a “welcome endorsement” that has been “often argued by human
rights lawyers [rather] than accepted by states”.157 The second and, according
149 See UN Refugee Convention, art 38, under which the only body competent to resolve dis-
putes regarding the interpretation of the convention is the International Court of
Justice, in the case of an inter-state dispute.
150 In its very first case of Michelot Yogogombaye v Senegal (in which the applicant requested
inter alia that the African Court rule that Senegal had violated the African Charter and
the OAU Refugee Convention), the African Court concluded that it did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear the case as Senegal had “not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to hear
cases instituted directly against the country by individuals or non-governmental organi-
zations”. In these circumstances, the court held that, pursuant to art 34(6) of its protocol,
it did not have jurisdiction to hear the application. See appln 001/2008, Michelot
Yogogombaye v Senegal, 15 December 2009, para 37.
151 Appln no 012/2015, 22 March 2018.
152 Comm no 317/06, above at note 137; comm no 97/93, John K Modise v Botswana, 6
November 2000.
153 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice
Initiative (on behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya) v the Government of
Kenya, decision no 002/Com/002/2009, 22 March 2011.
154 Ibid.
155 Id, para 88.
156 Comm no 317/06, above at note 137; comm no 97/93, above at note 152.
157 B Manby “Case note: Anudo Ochieng Anudo v Tanzania (judgment) (African Court on
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to most commentators, most important of the African Court’s contribution to
international law in this field, drawn from this judgment, relates to the bur-
den of proof.158 The African Court held that, in the context where an individ-
ual has previously been issued official documents recognizing nationality, the
burden of proof lies on the state to prove the contrary (to the satisfaction of an
independent tribunal).159 Lastly, the court further reasoned that, even if the
applicant were to be regarded as an alien by the respondent state, the state
would still be bound by article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which protects foreigners from any form of arbitrary
expulsion by providing them with legal guarantees.160
Despite the willingness of the African Commission to bring cases to the
African Court, most African states have not yet made a declaration recognizing
the right to individual petitions set forth in article 34(6) of the African Court
Protocol. This in turn has precluded the African Court from hearing cases
brought before it.161
CONCLUSION
This article began by analysing the evolution of the refugee definition as it
emerged in 1951, thereby unfolding the extent to which Africa responded
to omissions in the UN Refugee Convention and the subsequent 1967
Protocol. Having had recourse to the negotiations leading to the UN Refugee
Convention, this piece has shown that Egypt (the only representative from
Africa that joined as a participant) played an active role in extending the
scope of the protection of the UN Refugee Convention to further categories
of refugees. Furthermore, owing to efforts to adopt an African convention sep-
arate from the UN Refugee Convention, the latter instrument was revised by
means of a protocol that removed its temporal and geographical limitations.
The analysis of the preparatory work ultimately helped in unfolding subse-
quent legal consequences that should be drawn from the UN Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
Throughout the analysis of the Bangkok Principles and the OAU Refugee
Convention, this article has shown that some of their provisions are still
very much part of the legal framework today, and that some of them may pro-
vide evidence of customary rules of international law. Even though the OAU
contd
Human and Peoples’ Rights, app no 012/2015, 22 March 2018)” (2019) 1/1 Statelessness &
Citizenship Review 170 at 174.
158 See, for example, ibid.
159 Anudo v Tanzania, above at note 151, para 80.
160 Id, paras 99–101.
161 Gina Bekker advanced in 2013 that it was “likely that the African Commission will for
some time yet be the primary institution through which asylum-seekers and refugees
will seek to have their rights vindicated”: Bekker “The protection of asylum seekers”,
above note at 118 at 28.
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Refugee Convention was adopted to respond to certain refugee problems spe-
cific to the African continent, it “established an important precedent in inter-
national law” becoming a direct inspiration for other legal instruments for the
protection of refugees.162 Regional human rights instruments adopted under
the auspices of the African Union and its predecessor, the OAU, have further
enriched international refugee law. Likewise, as considered in this article,
the regional human rights mechanisms entrusted with their supervision
have also played an important role in the development of international refu-
gee law. Some of their pronouncements have further been endorsed by other
supra-national courts. Yet, it is obvious that Africa’s contributions to the pro-
gressive development of international refugee law, however positive, have not
yet solved the refugee situation in Africa, or elsewhere.
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None
162 Arboleda “Refugee definition”, above at note 38 at 195.
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